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DISABLING CERTITUDES:
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF MYTHOLOGIES OF
CONQUEST IN LAW
Jo Carrillo*
Narrative and mythology are powerful forces in human history and life.
They are also powerful in law, which is itself a narrative tradition.
Narrative and mythology are meant to explain and illuminate the mystery
we find ourselves in, but often they harden into intellectual dogmas whose
purpose is to teach images and symbols in the service of ideology. For
purposes of this paper, I label the intellectual dogmas that operate in legal
narrative "disabling certitudes."' Just as dogma hitches symbol and image
into the service of ideology, so too, in law, do disabling certitudes. I argue
here that disabling certitudes are meant to teach symbolic lessons; that is,
they turn on culturally accepted (and often culturally specific) symbols
presented repetitively in such a way that the images eventually come to be
unconsciously accepted as part of the fabric of law.
In the material I discuss here, disabling certitudes give rise to a
particular image. This image is of the indian, which in the context of
liberalism, is a foil for modernity. This indian is pre-modern, hopelessly
backward, somewhere closer in evolutionary scales to animals than
humans. This indian is a sign along the road of modernity; it points the
way for readers, steeping them further in liberal ideology, teaching them
critical lessons of liberalism such as the need for private property, the
exaltation of the individual over the group, and the like. This indian also
teaches the troubling lesson of white supremacy. For it is consistently this
indian's lackthatgetsjuxtaposed against the white amer-european's plenty
to make the point that nature and history favor those who have and take
over those who do not have, or for whatever reason cannot take.
The law and legal pedagogy I introduce here, especially given the way
they misrepresent and distort indigenous issues, serve a similar function
in the transmission of legal ideology. But they teach a lesson that has
hardened into dogma, and therefore depends on symbol for its
transmission. The lesson is so time-worn that it is transmitted and accepted
unconsciously. Indeed, to question the dogma would weaken and possibly
tear the fabric of symbolism by forcing questions, and thus opening up a
discussion of the sort of topics that today do not fit into the law school
curriculum. Questions, for instance, about the genocidal and racist
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foundations of the U.S., or about the forced removal of indigenous
communities, or about the theft of indigenous property by the United
States and its settlers.
A- The Relationship Between the Mythology of
Conquest and Legal Narrative
U.S. colonization by Europeans depended upon a mythology of
conquest. Colonization was as much a matter of narrative as of might and
commerce. It is well known and accepted that law was and still is a
powerful tool of colonization. In 19th century legal opinions about
indigenous issues judges drew consciously upon the current events oftheir
time, but they also drew unconsciously upon a mythology of conquest.
This mythology has far distant origins, but in its Americanized version,
indigenous peoples had no role other than to fare poorly as compared to
settlers. Indeed, in the mythology of conquest, indigenous peoples
represent nature, chaos, primitivism, animalism, communal property, and
the like - all forces characterized by liberal ideology as ones that
inevitably evolve into order.
In fashioning the mythology, the judges worked separately, not
necessarily collectively, or at least not knowingly so. I'm not arguing here
that the judges conspired about what the official narrative would be,
though an official narrative did indeed form, carrying with it ever
increasing weight and influence through the years. Instead, my view is that
while the judges worked separately, they shared an ideology, a social
experience of themselves in relation to the indian whom they designated
as the other.2 One important lesson these judicial opinions offer their
reader was (and still is) in part a social experience, specifically the social
experience of casting judgment on the other. The rhetorical force of the
opinions provided readers with a communal experience in which settlers
were represented as the evolved, civilization-bearing victors and indians
as the conquered, defeated, excluded outsiders. The audience was given
the opportunity if not the obligation to judge the indian based on the
misrepresentations articulated in judicial opinions. And the opinions were
written in such a way that the audience could very easily conclude that
they - as people sharing the social experience of casting judgment were indeed superior to the simulated indian whom they collectively
passed judgment on.
Opinions and texts in which the simulation of the indian is used as an
example still put readers in the seat of judgment in relation to the indian.

2. See THOMAS KEENAN, FABLES OF RESPONSIBILITY: ABERRATIONS AND PREDICAMENTS
IN ETHICS AND POLITICS 177-89 (1997) (discussing SLAVJO ZIZEK, THE SUBLIME OBJECT OF
IDEOLOGY (1990)).
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Studying legal narratives thus begins the process of outlining the
mythology of conquest upon which the narratives are based. This piece is
part of a larger work that maps the mythology of conquest (or multiple
mythologies, as the case may be) so that the ideas and logic contained
within it can be examined critically. I also want to understand how it is
that law contributes to and relies upon simulations of the indian. So part
of my larger project is to determine whether and how the mythology of
conquest has made its way into law generally, and into the teaching of law
more specifically. One early reviewer commented that this work might be
mistaken as a teacher's guide. Although I examine legal teaching materials
- specifically property casebooks - this work is not intended as a
pragmatic guide to teaching property, or wills and trusts, or any other
subject in the current law school curriculum. Rather I am writing
theoretically for the purpose of examining the way in which law in its
multiple expressions (opinions, pedagogical materials and the like)
discredits indigenous interests primarily by relying on a simulated indian
character that serves as a bar to the consideration of actual indigenous
concerns.
Indigenous litigants have been seriously handicapped by U.S. law.
Indeed, many of the most important cases have turned on disputes over the
controlling mythology or narrative. Is land sacred? Can a mountain or a
watershed be a numinous space, a place of community, history, meaning,
story, worship, love, identity, future and the like? Or, is a mountain just a
mountain whose value is judged by its harvestable timber?3 When a
mountain isjust a mountain, then assertions about the mountain's religious
significance sound romantic but impractical. But when a mountain is a
numinous space, assertions about the mountain as just an economic
resource sound like stupid human arrogance.
Unlike multiversal points occupying their centers simultaneously, 4
these settler and indigenous mythologies conflict in the sense that while it
might be possible to manage a wilderness area as both numinous space and
marketable resource, at some point there will be a clash in vision that
reminds us of the tensions drawn out in the biblical tale in which Jesus
enters a temple only to find it has become home to a thriving marketplace.
Using Christian narratives, some friends of the court evoked the temple
story in a recent case to point out that just as it was hard for Jesus to pray
and meditate amidst the buzz of the market in the temple, so it is for
practitioners of traditional indigenous spiritual practices to pray amidst the

3. See e.g., R. C. GORDON-MCCurcHAN, THE TAOS INDIANS AND THE BATTLE FOR BLUE
LAKE 7 (1995).

4. This example is drawn from one offered by
of Oklahoma Press, forthcoming).
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buzz of chain saws, logging trucks, front-end loaders, and the like.' In
some cases, in other words, depending on the resource in question, the
resolution does present an either-or choice. One either cuts down an
ancient tree, or one does not. What is destroyed cannot be rebuilt, or
regrown, or regained. There are legal disputes in which it is impossible to
be of both worlds, so to speak. One world or vision must give way to the
other. One world or vision is chosen over the other, especially if one of the
alternatives materially and ecologically consumes the very space in
question. Thus, legal proceedings are not only about doctrine, or who wins
and loses; they are also, in a sense, about how narrative will set the course
for the material future. The way in which legal narratives are produced and
controlled, modified and questioned (if at all), will and do bring a future
(and futures) into being.
The legal mythology of conquest, itself a narrative, has robbed
indigenous communities of their right to control, or even to participate in
the credited production of the U.S.' governing mythologies. Yet, whether
they are credited or not, indigenous peoples have always insisted upon
their right to survive as peoples, as well as upon their right to resist or to
participate in the imagining of the nation that now surrounds them. Gerald
Vizenor calls this imagining "survivance," which he defines as more than
mere physical survival. Survivance is "an active sense of presence, the
continuance of native stories, not a mere reaction, or a survivable name.
Native survivance stories are the renunciation of dominance, tragedy, and
victimry. ' Survivance is carrying on, given the context, and yet staying
vital to one's ideals, one's visions, one's ethics and responsibilities, one's
mythologies; it is living by one's own images and symbols, and thereby
establishing what Vizenor refers to as an imagic presence Whereas
"native" stories are cues to modernity, signaling perhaps a return-to-thepast defense against modernity, the postindian is "the actual tease of
human contingencies" in the here and now.9 The postindian "absolves by
irony the nominal simulations ofthe indian."' For Vizenor, the postindian
is itself a form of survivance.
Legal narratives of conquest rely on symbols - or, what Vizenor calls
immovable simulations - of the indian." This symbol, especially in
5.
question
interests
6.
(1994).
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

See Lyng v. N.W. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n, 485 U.S. 439 (1988) (deciding the
of whether and to what degree the U.S. Forest Service had to take indigenous religious
into account when building a road through a sacred wilderness area).
GERALD VIZENOR, MANIFEST MANNERS: NARRATIVES OF POSTINDIAN SURVIVANCE

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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relation to other powerful legal symbols, such as the symbol of the tragic
commons," is a powerful way of reducing options and possibilities related
to the methods of understanding, perceiving, relating to "resources" and
so forth. These symbols work to exclude an indigenous imagic presence.
Legal narratives render indigenous assertions of myth and vision
immediately suspect, especially as infused with economics as late 20th
century legal narratives are. Over time, these legal narratives force the
indigenous vision to comply with garish stereotype or else to risk being
ignored or more astonishingly to risk being labeled "wrong" or
"inauthentic" because they do not comport with the stereotyped notions of
who indians are and ought to be. Vizenor calls this phenomenon manifest
manners, which he defines as "the course of dominance, the racialist
notions and misnomers sustained in archives and lexicons as 'authentic'
representations of indian cultures."13 The net result is that the expression
of the indigenous communities, individuals, and litigants - their imagic
presence - is stifled, silenced, muffled, and replaced with the immovable
simulation of the indian. These simulations are familiar: indians as great
environmentalists, 4 indians as communal land holders (obviously a wrong
approach to property holding given the tragedy of the commons), 5 indians
as inefficient spiritualists, 6 indians as fierce warring communities, 7 and
so forth. They depend on theories of authenticity (who is a realindian) and
legal authentification (whom does the law recognize as a real indian) for
their validity."8 They allow the law - a discourse of dominance - to
define who and what is indian as a matter of law, politics, and ideology. 9
In the language of the 19th century the suspicion and rejection of the
indigenous imagic presence gets coded in the binary that opposes the
"uncivilized" against the "civilized." In the language of the 21st century

12. 1 contend that the commons is now a symbol because it is used as a disabling certitude
dealing with the possible ways of owning property. The commons is now often presented as
inevitably leading to depletion of the resource as set forth in Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the
Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). For further discussion, With additional footnotes, of the
concept of the debate over the existence of the public domain in the field of intellectual property,
see Jo Carrillo, Protectinga Piece ofAmerican Folklore: the Example of the Gusset, 4 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 203 (1997).
13. VIZENOR, supra note 6, at I.
14. See e.g. Carol M. Rose, Given-ness andGift: Propertyandthe Questfor Environmental
Ethics, 24 ENVTL. L. 1 (1994).
15. See e.g., DUKEMINIER & KRIER, PROPERTY 16-19 (4th ed. 1998).
16. See Lyng, 485 U.S. at 439.
17. See Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
18. See The Mashpee Indians' Story (explained further in Jack Campisi, The Mashpee
Indians: Tribe on Trial, in READINGS INAMERICAN INDIAN LAW: RECALLING THE RHYTHM OF
SuRVIVAL 32-42 (Jo Carrillo ed., (1998)).

19. See e.g., LauraNader &Jay Ou, IdealizationandPower:Legality and TraditioninNative
American Law, 23 OKLA. CITY U. L. R. 13 (1998).
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it gets coded in an economic binary that opposes the "inefficient" against
the "efficient."
But what exactly is this mythology of conquest as it exists in law as a
literature (or discourse) of dominance? What are its parameters, its
themes? Who are its characters? How do those characters come together,
and what is the result? In other words, what is the story (the narrative or
simulation) that judges, lawyers, law professors, and their students tell in
law about the indigenous peoples who lived and still live within the
boundaries of the U.S.? How closely do the simulations of law come to a
contemporary indigenous imagic presence? Or more accurately, how badly
do the simulations of the indian in law misrepresent and thus exclude an
indigenous imagic presence? And how does the U.S. mythology of
conquest compare to what we know about other countries' mythologies,
like Australia's for example? 0
Given the above framework, then, the theoretical basis for this paper
is the idea that while law is a rational endeavor 2 there are nevertheless
' that exist
"glint[s] of symbolism and enchantment" 22
within its parameters,
meaning within legal narrative. These glints are important to analyze
whether they are a large or small part of law, or whether they are even
close to what constitutes the law as we purport to understand it. They show
the "slow, delicate shift in the meanings of concepts," and thus form "an
essential part of social history. 23
Thus by identifying mythologies of conquest within the narrative of
law, this work brings into focus a symbolic site - the indian - where the
fabric of rationalism has not quite cohered; where unexamined ideas,
certitudes, dogmas about and simulations of the indian disable the legal
process and consciousness.24 Obviously I am distinguishing rationality
20. The international dimensions of this discussion are outside the scope of this paper.
2 1. See generally MAX WEBER, MAX WEBER ON LAW IN ECONOMY AND SOCIETY (Max
Rheinstein, ed., 1954). The applicable theme of Max Weber's work is the idea that there has been
movement from traditional forms of authority toward rational-legal forms of authority. See id. For
an explication of Weber, in the sense that his work is invoked here, see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN,
THE REPUBLIC OF CHOICE: LAW, AUTHORITY, AND CULTURE 38-39, 211-12 (1990).

22. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 39.
23. Id. at 26.
24. A symbol is defined here as the means by which archetypes, ofwhich we typically remain
unconscious, communicate to consciousness. In Jung's framework, instincts, archetypes and
symbols all stand in relation to each other. Instincts are physiological urges, and archetypes are the
(typically unconscious) emotional and intellectual significance we give to instinctual urges. In
Jung's framework, archetypes are the inclination to form pictures so that the unconscious can
communicate with consciousness, and symbols are the means by which archetypes get
communicated to consciousness. Symbols are not passed on by heredity; they are passed on by
acculturation. Thus in the terms of this framework, the law, as a distinct culture, could indeed have
its own symbols for expressing information. Symbols impart information to the consciousness, but
their strength is at least made clear (if not diminished) by bringing them to consciousness for
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from symbolism, but not, I hope, in order to simplistically privilege one
over the other. Instead, what I want to demonstrate is the interrelatedness
between logic and illogic, at least when it comes to studying indians in
law." I contend that with respect to indigenous interests and issues, when
indians are discussed in law, and particularly in the property curriculum,
symbol gets presented as rational analysis, fiction gets passed off as
historical fact, and the use of symbol and fiction go unchallenged in
recitations of the legal narrative. In other words, the simulations of the
indian are what the law relies on to exclude indigenous imagic presence,
ultimately ensuring that symbol - what Vizenor enlivens by calling
simulation26 - and mythology express thought "more trenchantly and, in
the end, far more clearly than the clearest concept," since the symbol both
conveys information to the mind, and "brings a re-experience of it" to the
being."
Identifying places in law where references to indigenous interests are
more a dissemination of mythology than accurate information serves two
clear purposes. The first is that it begins a more consciously reasoned
analysis than we now have of how the symbol of the indian is a foil used
to teach liberal ideologies behind Anglo-American property rights. The
second purpose is that it points out a site in law that is consistent with a
view of symbol as both a way in which to disseminate information and a
way to re-experience or alternatively repress past collective trauma.2"
Indeed, I call the symbolic site I identify in this paper a "disabling
certitude," 9 by which I mean a place where systems of hierarchy,
entitlement and positional privilege subordinate, through uncritical
acceptance of symbol, the "ideological self-conception of a liberal legal
order."30 It is a place where the law does not practice the liberal values it
preaches.

examination. See ENCOUNTERING JUNG: JUNG ON MYTHOLOGY 39-40 (Robert A. Segal, ed., 1998)
[hereinafter ENCOUNTERING JUNG]; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM,

POETIC JUSTICE: THE

LITERARY IMAGINATION AND PUBLIC LIFE 53-72 (1995), exploring the tension between "emotions"
(which symbols invoke by communicating the power of the archetype which in turn explains the
power of the instinctual) and "reason."
25. See Pierre Legendre, The Other Dimensionof Law (Yafit Hachamovitch trans.), in LAW
AND THE POSTMODERN MIND: ESSAYS ON PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Goodrich

& David Gray Carlson eds., 1998), where Legendre states that the medieval turn to law arose not
out of a privileging adherence to rationality as a mode of analysis, but out of spirituality and
mysticism. See also NUSSBAUM, supra note 24.
26. See VIZENOR, supra note 6.
27. ENCOUNTERING JUNG supra note 24, at 89-90.
28. See id
29. Lewis, supra note 1.
30. NICOLA LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBjECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND SOCIAL

THEORY 188 (1998).
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A disabling certitude is a site where the rational-legal system's fabric
gives way to symbolism, magic, or enchantment. It is a place that "cannot
be tackled with ordinary rational methods."'" A place where "memory
fades and mythological interpretations of the beginnings of human society
take hold in the popular imagination."32 It is a place of concentrated
ideological importance and meaning, thus making it a site within which
one is sure to find many allegedly universal truths, assertions, barriers, and
binaries rotating around myths (in this case insinuated into the law) whose
loss is stubbornly guarded against by those whom the myths most clearly
mirror, which is to say, their intended audience.33 A disabling certitude is
a place where the alternatives we are accustomed to are diminished into a
startling, obvious, and concentrated lack of alternative. Disabling
certitudes create what Pierre Legendre, the French jurist and
psychoanalyst,34 calls "obstacles to the liberty of thought [esprit]." A
disabling certitude might also be a site of impasse - an aporia - where
two alternatives emerge but then dead end.36 The disabling certitudes
found in mythologies of conquest could fairly be classified as intellectual
dogmas: ideas that demand non-analysis out of ideological imperative,37
habit, 38 politics,3 9 or the need to administer to individual or collective
trauma.4 One could say that disabling certitudes are a psychologically
protected state of studied ignorance. Instead of seeing no evil, we
acknowledge no past. Like the Medieval exemplum, disabling certitudes
further didacticism, not critical analysis. And they work by disseminating
information almost irrespective of the disseminator's conscious intention.
As such, they function most obviously as places in the legal consciousness
that - in the prescient words of Chief Justice John Marshall - "cannot

31. ENCOUNTERING JUNG, supra note 24, at 92.
32. VINE DELORIA JR. & DAVID E. WILKINS, TRIBE, TREATIES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
TRIBULATIONS vii (1999).
33. See Segal, supra note 24, at 94, noting that myths have a vital meaning, as they are the

psychic life of the group; thus the group insinuates the myths into other institutions in order to
prevent the loss of its mythological heritage, as that loss "is always and everywhere, even among
the civilized, a moral catastrophe." Id. at 94.
34. For an introduction to Legendre, see Peter Goodrich, Translating Legendre, or the
Poetical Sermon of a ContemporaryJurist, in LAW AND THE POSThIODERN MIND: ESSAYS ON

PSYCHOANALYSIS AND JURISPRUDENCE (Peter Goodrich & David Gray Carlson eds., 1998).
35. Legendre, supra note 25, at 175.
36. See Jo Carrillo, The American Indianand the Problem of History (C. Martin ed. 1987),
33 ARIZ. L. REV. 281 (1991).
37. See Robert A. Williams, The Algebra of Federal Indian Law: The Hard Trail of
Decolonizing andAmericanizing the White Man's Indian Jurisprudence,1986 WiS. L. REV. 219.
38. See Legendre, supra note 25.
39. See Deloria & Wilkins, supra note 32.
40. See Segal, supra note 24.
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be questioned."' Indeed they are the discursive places where the U.S.'
mythological narrative and symbolic lexicon about its own origins are
stubbornly protected by those whom the mythology benefits. This is the
paradox of the U.S. mythology of conquest still actively disseminated in
American legal pedagogy, scholarship, and court opinions.
B. Examples
The following are examples that use the symbol of the indian to make
their point. The first example I take up is Felix Cohen's American
exceptionalist argument that the vast majority of land was purchased from
indigenous communities, not stolen or otherwise taken as a result of
conquest.42 The second example is Chief Justice John Marshall's legal
opinion in Johnson v. McIntosh,43 a text that I argue is many things
including a creation (originary) story and an admonition against
questioning. The third example is taken from the 1997 edition of a widely
used property law casebook.
1. Cohen's American Exceptionalism
Felix S. Cohen invoked U.S. exceptionalism arguing in defense of
legislation that would allow indigenous communities to sue the U.S.
government for the uncompensated loss of aboriginal land." According to
Cohen, U.S. policy was based on purchase, unlike the policy of other
European nations acting under the Doctrine of Discovery.45 Cohen then
linked policy with action when he posited that the U.S. actedhonorably as
demonstrated by its policy to purchase as opposed to simply steal or
otherwise take indigenous land; and so, his argument went, the U.S. should
continue to act honorably by passing a statute allowing indigenous groups
to sue the U.S. for compensation of land lost by theft or unfair practices."'
Cohen's argument, like Chief Justice John Marshall's before him, tapped
into the mythology of conquest. In Cohen's version, as in Marshall's, the
conqueror was equitable and just - two central liberal ideals. But whereas
Marshall acknowledged the fact of conquest (theft), Cohen's 20th century
version insisted for instrumental reasons, that the great bulk of land had
been legitimately purchased, not simply taken.47

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (Wheat. 8) 543, 591 (1823).
See Felix S. Cohen, OriginalIndian Title, 32 MINN. L. REv. 28 (1947).
21 U.S. (Wheat. 8) 543 (1823).
See Cohen, supra note 42, at 56-58.
See id. at 35.
See id. at 56-57.
See id. at 35.
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Cohen started out by suggesting that while school children might
believe the land was stolen, in actuality fair trades had been made, though
they might not appear to be fair in hindsight." As support for his
argument, Cohen used appellate court cases, not historical or sociological
evidence.49 The fair trades were not economically fair, to be sure, a point
Cohen acknowledged. But in the end, Cohen implied, land was exchanged
for either monetary benefits or for intangibles such as education, exposure
to Christianity, and "civilization." According to Cohen, the amereuropeans drove hard Yankee bargains, a Lochnerian notion that Cohen
himself introduced into the mythology of conquest.50 Thus, Cohen's view
introduced a theme of American exceptionalism into the mythology of
conquest, and the disabling certitudes upon which it is based. Cohen's
view offers an introductory vignette to demonstrate my broader argument,
which is that the law, as it is presented especially in casebooks, but also in
legal opinions and in legal scholarship, is offered pedagogically to educate
students about liberal ideals and narratives, not to encourage them to
critically assess or otherwise question those narratives.
2. John Marshall's Johnson Narrative
Johnson v. McIntosh is part legal text, part historical narrative, part
creation story, and part symbolic text with a political function. It does
indeed have a strange, strangely logical, puzzling sentiment wafting
through it, beginning with its explicit admonition against questioning. As
Justice Marshall puts it, "the right of society to prescribe those rules by
which property'5may be acquired and preserved is not, and cannot be drawn
into question." '
The basic themes of Marshall's narrative are these: the story starts with
European action, specifically the European action of crossing the ocean

48. See United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians, 448 U.S. 371, 415-17 (1980) (calling into
question Cohen's view that the adequacy of past consideration cannot be revisited) "[An essential
element of the inquiry. . . is determining the adequacy of the consideration the government gave
for the Indian lands it acquired. That inquiry cannot be avoided by the government's simple
assertion that it acted in good faith in its dealings with the Indians." Id. at 416-17.
49. All evidence can be ideologically collected and shaped, but the point is that Cohen

asserted his historical correction based on appellate court cases, which represent views of the elite
from the top, not on broader historical or sociological pools of evidence. See Cohen, supranote 42,
at 38-43. Moreover, Cohen acknowledged the indigenous point of view, but characterized it as one
lacking in sense. See id. He argued that if Indians thought bad deals were good, that was essentially
their downfall in the face of what Cohen characterized as "hard Yankee bargains." Id. at 42.
50. Id. at 42; see also Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding that a state statute
prohibiting the employment of bakery employees for more than 10 hours a day or 60 hours a week
interfered with the right of contract between the employer and the employees).
51. 21 U.S. (8 Wheat) 543, 572 (1823).

20001
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and arriving on the continent of America. 2 But as there were indigenous
groups in European settlement areas, something had to be done. Marshall
goes through the colonial history to conclude that indigenous groups had
the right to occupancy as against settlers.53 There were no land speculators
in Justice Marshall's story, nor are the settlers invading, no matter how
unfounded their claims about their control of the continent. Rather they are
cast as ambitious, innocent, at worst pretentious nations that "on the
discovery of this immense continent" were "eager to appropriate to
themselves so much of it as they could respectively acquire."54 By the time
of Cohen's 1947 Minnesota article, this tendency toward pretension was
transformed into a national American quality: the ability to drive hard
Yankee bargains.5"
Under the Doctrine of Discovery, the European nations had the right of
acquisition to lands that they were the first to claim, and their respective
settlers took this to heart. Ironically, this European first-in-time principle
justified the late coming European's claims even as against the first in time
indigenous peoples, in Marshall's narrative, because "the character and
religion of [the indigenous] inhabitants afforded an apology for
considering them as a people over whom the superior genius of Europe
might claim an ascendancy." 6 Acquisition in Cohen's 20th century postWorld War II view, took place primarily by purchase," but Marshall's
19th century colonialist view acknowledges that it also took place "by the
sword" and as such was a "title by conquest," legitimately acquired and
maintained by a force justified by the "character and religion" which

52. See id.
53. See id. at 574.
54. Id. at 572.
55. See Cohen, supra note 42, at 42.
56. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. Marshall uses the "character and religion" and the "character
and habits" of the people at least twice. See id. at 573, 588, 589; see also M.F. LINDLEY, THE
ACQUISITION AND GOVERNMENT OF BACKWARD TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: BEING A

TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE RELATING TO COLONIAL EXPANSION I1-17, 25-31 (1926)

(putting Marshall's language in the context of legal arguments that were contemporaneous with
Johnson).
57. See Cohen, supra note 42, at 35, reiterated in Howard R. Berman, The Concept of
Aboriginal Rights in the Early Legal History of the United States, 27 BUFF. L. REv. 637 (1978)
(elevating Cohen's thesis to historical fact), and in John Leshy, IndigenousPeoples,Land Claims
and Control of Mineral Development: US. and Australian Legal Systems Compared, 8 U. NEW
SOUTH WALES L. J.271, 275-77, 299-301 (1985) (applying Cohen's assertion that the vast majority
of indigenous land was purchased to show that indigenous property interests in terms of mineral
rights have been recognized, not disregarded, by the U.S.; Leshy then advocates that Australia
adopt the U.S. model of recognition and compensation over its own historic model of nonrecognition and non-compensation). Of course, these arguments had earlier antecedents in legal
arguments of Marshall's time. See e.g. CRIBBET, et al.,
PROPERTY 37, 83 (7th ed. 1996); THE
MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY 457-65 (William W. Story ed., 1972).
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devolves later in Marshall's opinion to the "character and habits" of the
indigenous peoples.58 Thus for Marshall, amer-european greed gets
converted into pretentious eagerness, which sometimes led to fair land
transactions, but more often led to the violent dispossession of indigenous
communities. In Marshall's time, land theft gets packaged into a "title by
conquest;" 59 however, by Cohen's time, it gets repackaged into the view
that amer-europeans almost always paid for the land they took from
indigenous communities.
Today, Johnson is interpreted in law as troubling, yet necessary for
U.S. nation building. It is also regarded as doctrinally protective of tribal
(collective) property interests, in the sense that but for Johnson, indigenous
land would have been available for direct sale from indigenous owners to
settlers, and thus diminished. By placing the source of land title with the
U.S., the argument goes, indigenous actors were eventually left with
"something," since after Johnson the U.S. could legally protect even that
land to which indigenous peoples had aboriginal title. 60 The typical tack
property casebook editors use to deal with John Marshall's opinion is to
reconstruct John Marshall as a heroic federalist valiantly opposed to the
Jacksonian Democrats. 6' In this opposition, John Marshall becomes a
cultural hero, fighting on behalf of the unrepresented indigenes. This
canonical view of Marshall ironically takes him out of an amer-european
vs. indigenous context and puts him instead into a narrower amereurocentric political context. In this way, Marshall is applauded for his
decision despite the unfairness of his representations of indian character62

58. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573, 588, 589.
59. Id. at 589.
60. See e.g. GORDON HYLTON, et al. Property Law and the Public Interest: Cases and
Materials 28 (1998) (citing Johnson in the context of the Indian Non-Intercourse Act of 1790, Act
of July 22, 1790, Ch. 33, 1 Stat. 137, 138).
61. See e.g. JOHN P. DWYER & PETER S. MENELL, PROPERTY LAW AND POLICY: A
COMPARATIVE INSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE (1998), which nevertheless notes:
The decision is a minor aftershock in a far more momentous collision between
Indian and European cultures between the fifteenth and nineteenth centuries.
Nevertheless it raises (even if it does not satisfactorily answer) some important
questions about the cultural contingency of every conception of property and
about the origin and justification of property rights.

Id. at 69; see also CuRTs J. BERGER & JOAN C. WILLIAMS, PROPERTY: LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE

20 (1997) (characterizing the conflict that resulted from European acquisitiveness as a "clash
between Native American property systems and the intuitive image of absolute ownership").
62. See SCOTT MICHAELSEN, THE LIMITS OF MULTICULTURALISM: INTERROGATING THE
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGY 159 (1999) (distinguishing between shades of meaning
communicated by the words "character," "culture," and "history;" arguing that the use of the word
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on the ground that he was a man of his time, living in a period when
violence against indigenous peoples was viewed as the normal state of
things, racialist characterizations (hierarchically understood cultural
contingencies) were the order of the day, and what really mattered was
Marshall's federalist heroism in the face of the Jacksonian Democrats. The
moralistic push of the argument excusing Justice Marshall for not entering
into controversies that he ultimately and actually enters into with
noticeable vigor - such as "whether agriculturists, merchants and
manufacturers, have a right, on abstract principles, to expel hunters from
' - is that we
the territory they possess, or to contract their limits"63
modems ought not criticize the past with our presentist values.' Of course
this refusal to analyze, in itself, is an admonition not to question.
If Marshall's simulated indian is indeed presented without critique as
"primitive,' 65 or "uncivilized," a student segueing in a course casebook
from Johnson into economic arguments about productivity' is primed for
what is often (predictably) the next lesson in the property casebook:
learning that indigenous rights are mere occupancy rights, and accepting
that any and all of the violence that flowed from such a dispossession was
a (necessary) cost of nation building in an evolutionary world, meaning a
worldview that says humans are structured along a hierarchized racial
scale governed by evolution.
This particular evolutionary anthropological lesson is a longstanding
one in the annals of U.S. legal history,67 though its terms are today
obscured by the late 20th century economic language of costs and
benefits.68 But in the unselfconscious 19th century language of manifest
destiny, the framework of an evolutionary anthropology comes through
loud and clear, even as late as 1930, as an article in the elite Yale Law
Journal demonstrates:

character individualizes the subject, whereas the use of the words culture or history erase the
subject's individuality by aggregating the individual with the group).
63. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 588; see also CRIBBET, supra note 57.

64. Justice Rehnquist makes this argument in his dissent in U.S. v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S.
at 435, when he says: "It seems to me quite unfair to judge by the light of 'revisionist' historians
or the mores of another era actions that were taken under pressure of time more than a century ago."
65. See e.g. CRIBBET, supra note 57, at 37, 83.
66. See e.g. DUKEmrNIE & KRIER, supra note 15, at 11-19, (following Johnson with
economic articles and notes about private property, exclusivity, and the tragedy of the commons).
67. See e.g. Robert E. Bieder, A Brief HistoricalSurvey of the ExpropriationofAmerican
IndianRemains (a paper presented to Congress), in READINGS INAMERICAN INDIAN LAW 164-71
(1990); Jo Carrillo, The RepatriationofCulturalProperty,in READINGS INAMERICANINDIAN LAW
153-63 (1990).
68. See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of PropertyRights, 57 AM. ECON. REv. 347-57
(Pap. & Poc. 1967), cited in DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 15, at 40.
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A certain liberality of spirit resents any 'Americanization' of
the Indian, preferring that he be preserved in his ancient life,
culture, government, morals, and religion. There is indeed
much worth preserving, but it must be recognized that an
inexorable destiny dooms the ancient primitive life of the
Indian before the advance of our modem civilization.69
This language gets modified by the end of the century, and more
optimistic about how much better indigenous peoples have it in the U.S.
today than they did in the 19th century, as demonstrated by this 1997 law
review article published in the equally prestigious Stanford Law Review:
The First Amendment refers to the free exercise of religion,
as if religion were wholly separable from other aspects of
individuals' lives. Although this isolation of religion from
other aspects of life may accurately reflect the AngloAmerican perspective of the First Amendment's drafters, it is
foreign to the Native American world view.7"
To be sure, indigenous peoples are still other in the 1997 account,
despite its useful collection of cases. Indigenous peoples are lumped
together en masse and implied to possess a stubbornly unchangeable and
unchanged, identifiable, single "Native American world view;""' indeed,
the Native American world view. The article later optimistically (and
wrongly) concludes, in a section titled (ironically) "The More Things
Change, the More They Remain the Same," that "Native Americans are no
longer subjected to overt government efforts to suppress their traditional
beliefs and practices."72 Indian problem virtually solved; but the indian
problem rages on. In this tale, the indian gets to keep that old time religion,
that ancient way of life, culture and government, morals and religion in a phrase: "the Native American world view" 73 - thanks to a certain
liberality of spirit that offers to analyze the problem in light of the First
Amendment. Indeed, in this view, any remaining aspects of the 19th
century Indian problem are tamable because they are mere problems of
translation.74 Instead of an inexorable destiny dooming "the ancient

69. Ray A. Brown, The Indian Problem and The Law, 39 YALE L.J. 307, 319 (1930). This
theme appears at least as early as the writings of Joseph Story, see STORY, supranote 57, at 462-64.
70. Allison M. Dussias, Ghost Dance and Holy Ghost: The Echoes ofNineteenth-Century
ChristianizationPolicy in Twentieth Century Native American Free Exercise Cases, 49 STAN. L.
REV. 773, 806 (1997).
71. Id.

72. Id.at 851.
73. Id. at 806.
74. See id. at 851-2.
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primitive life of the Indian before the advance of our modem
civilization,"'7 5 the modem civilization has punched out a space where "the
Native American world view" can exist.76 Exist; not thrive or influence or
direct or challenge-just exist.
3. A Casebook Example, circa 1997
In my opinion, no property casebook published today calls Chief
Justice Marshall's fabulously fictional narrative into question. Ironically,
however, whether the casebook editor sympathizes (actually they all
implicitly sympathize) with indigenous peoples or not, the effect is the
same. The Cribbet, Johnson, Findley, and Smith casebook stands alone in
explicitly adopting an evolutionist lens for analyzing the relationship
between the indigenous and the non-indigenous. In discussing attributes
of property, the Cribbet casebook asks: "Would it be fair to say that
property, in a legal sense, has any meaning for species other than
mankind? Why or why not?"" This query replicates the positioning of the
indian other near the animal other, a troubling but recurring motif seen in
countless texts, including Johnson, and the work of Lewis H. Morgan,78 a
19th century anthropologist whom the Cribbet casebook cites as an
authority on the subject. 9 But, rather than stop there, the editorial voice
continues: "Note, however, that even the most primitive human societies
have some concept of property."80
This remark is followed by a 1928 commentary that itself remarks on
Morgan's 1877 work detailing what Morgan thought were the major
periods of civilization: savagery, barbarism, and civilization." A comment,
within a comment, within a comment pulling students from the cusp of the
21st century squarely back into the 19th, thus distancing the casebook
from multiculturalism so as to align it with "anthropology," meaning an
evolutionary anthropology that designates whites superior, and indigenous
peoples inferior. Morgan, the Cribbet casebook informs students, places
the emergence of the property institution in "the Middle Status of
Barbarism- exemplified by the village life of our Southwestern Indians,
of the aboriginal Mexicans, and the Peruvians." [Emphasis added.]f The
excerpt goes on to state that Morgan thought that "among 'savages'...

75. Brown, supra note 69, at 319.
76. Dussias, supranote 70, at 806 (emphasis added).
77. CRIBBET, supra note 57, at 35.
78. See LEWIs HENRY MORGAN, ANcIENT SoCIETY (1877).
79. See CRIBBET, supra note 57, at 36 (citing Michaelson).
80. Id. at 36.
81. See id. (citing Lowie, IncorporealPropertyin PrimitiveSociety, 37 YALE L. J.551-54,
561 (1928)).
82. Id.
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property was inconsiderable. 8 3 As the Morgan excerpt is intended by
casebook editors to raise the issue of "incorporeal property in primitive
society," 4 it is followed by this (20th century) editorial note:
The rudimentary concepts of a primitive people are greatly
expanded by modem civilizations whose articulate
philosophers and molders of public thought must seek
rationalizations for their views of so vital a social institution
[as property]., 5
Here once again the belief is disseminated that indigenous property
systems are monolithic and simple in comparison to the vast, nuanced,
rational U.S. common law based system.
The entire discussion of the "primitive" ends several pages later by
coupling the evolutionist framework laid out above with the nationbuilding excuse so often extended to Johnson. Indeed the editorial voice
introduces Johnson by asking a question not unlike the question a
progressive casebook poses about the balance of justice and power. The
Cribbet casebook asks:
Is there any doubt about the role which property (in this case
land) played in the development of the United States into a
world power? Could the adjustment of the Indians' claim of
ownership have been handled in a different way? What would
have been the consequences of the various solutions you may
have in mind?86
Solutions? To what? From whose point of view? Who is speaking here
and to whom? Is there a difference in effect, notwithstanding the radical
difference in intention between the more progressive casebooks and this
treatment of indigenous interests, other than that Cribbet seems to invoke
a word - "solution" - which in the context of the 21st century, makes
a chilling allusion to 20th century justifications for genocide? How do
intentionally progressive anti-racist analyses and an intentionally"
"scientific" evolutionary analysis that purports to be neutral on the issue
of race end up in the same place, asking the same questions, teaching the
same binaries? What force is at work here?

83. Id.
84. Id. at 37-38.
85. CRIBBET supra note 57, at 37-38.
86. CRIBBET supra note 57, at 77.
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C. Thy Symbolic Indian and the Exclusion
of the Indigenous Imagic Presence
These examples, abbreviated as they are, introduce the analysis of how
legal narrative is premised on disabling certitudes (symbols, or the more
enlivened idea of simulations) that function to disseminate symbolic,
mythological information about what one casebook labels "the case of
whiteness" in relation to indigenous peoples.8 7 My hope here is to point
out that the relationship between disabling certitudes and the dissemination
of symbol is clear enough to show that disabling certitudes are observably
dogmatic, meaning biased, and yet continuously disseminated as universal
truths, meaning general assertions that operate across the human spectrum.
These symbols are promoted as independent of cultural bias, but they are
observably culture specific as well as ideologically determined.
Indeed, the fact that indigenous rights and interests are discussed in the
first year curriculum only in the first year property course functionally
transforms the indian into a signifier whose political function throughout
the rest of law school is essentially to make student-initiates of the legal
profession skeptical about indigenous property interests on both a broad,
ideological level as well as on an unconscious, symbolic level. By signifier
I mean that indians in the legal discussions analyzed here 'stand in for'
the unrepresentable," 8 thus allowing the non-indigenous settler subject to
interpret him or herself and the world known as America as the indian's
opposite: representable, coherent, ordered, civilized, efficient, manageable
and so forth.
Signifiers in my definition also serve a political function; they hold
strength "precisely in their 'contentlessness."' ' 9 Ideas like 'democracy,'
'human rights' or 'community', for instance, are signifiers that "remain to
be filled out by the fantasies of the subjects to whom they are addressed:
the signifiers construct rather than describe the entities to which they
refer."9' Precisely because they are contentless, discourses riddled with
signifiers are unstable. While they seem to address, maybe even assuage,
the anxiety or hopelessness that underlie the trauma they stand in for,
ultimately they fail in this task. This is because the traumas for which they
stand - in this case the genocidal foundations of the U.S. - conflict
irreconcilably with the liberalistic notion of individual equality that stems
from the protection of property rights. Sadly these conflicts remain
87. JUAN F. PEREA, et al., RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE
AMERICA 429 (2000).
88. LACEY, supra note 30, at 132 (1998); see also ANNABEL PATTERSON, FABLES OF POWER:
AESOPIAN WRITING AND POLITICAL HISTORY (1991).

89. LACEY, supra note 30, at 133-34 (citing RENATA SALECL, THE SPOILS OF FREEDOM:
PSYCHOANALYSIS AND FEMINISM AFTER THE FALL OF SOCIALISM 131 (1994)).
90. Id. at 133.
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unrepresented, undiscussed and undiscussable, hidden away in legal
discourse today.
America in most histories of significance is then, as some scholars
argue, presented as an ethnically cleansed geography, a place whose
beginning was with Europeans and no other groups.9 If indigenous
communities are mentioned at all it is often in the form of the indian
signifier, which I argue, is a point meant to elucidate something about the
allegedly superior non-indigenous path on the continent, not the
indigenous path or alternatively the ways in which the paths came
together. In this scheme, no reference to or elaboration of the indigenous
imagic presence can occur.
Thus political signifiers can never, by definition, deliver what they
promise, they can never assuage the guilt or trauma of genocide, because
they have no content. Indeed, in the case of indigenous communities, the
function of the indian signifier is to avoid or suppress any discussion of
genocide, or even of violence and thus to encourage the view of America
as a sparsely settled continent prior to European arrival. In developing his
ideas about survivance, Gerald Vizenor specifically points out that the
simulated indian is a signifier that predictably points to the absence of the
indigenous, and as such it becomes a way to ethnically cleanse the idea if
not the geography of America, of indigenous peoples, histories, and
narratives."
In law the currently accepted symbol of the indian - the simulated
indian - also signals the absence of the indigenous imagic presence. But
the indian as a signifier is not fixed in terms of its "democratic or antidemocratic tendencies . . . : [a signifier] can express different fantasy
structures, different economies of desire, for different subjects at different
times."93 This is why in the 19th century the symbol of the indian can have
one meaning or a set of meanings, and an entirely different but still
functionally similar set of meanings in the 20th century.
As with its content, the symbol can have different meanings depending
upon its context, so that it's meaning in the U.S., for example, can coincide
or not with its meaning in Australia or New Zealand or Peru or Brazil or
Canada at any given time. In other words, the simulated indian used today
is a shell concept, a shell image, a simulation, a projection. It functions
somewhat like the joker in a deck of cards to mark a space in the
discourse, but that space is at one and the same time potentially haunted
by all those Other indigenous persons and peopleswho have been excluded
from this country's legal protections by physical force, genocide, fraud,
ideological force, economic disadvantage, and the like.
91. See WEAVER, supra note 4.
92. See VIZENOR, supra note 6.
93. Id.
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It is my observation that students enter law school utterly ignorant
about the indigenous past, but very willing to learn. But they learn what
we teach them. If we continue to teach the genocidal simulations of the
indian, we will continue to deprive them of an indigenous imagic presence.
We will continue teaching the idea of the ethnically cleansed America. We
will also essentially force - through the precedential value of legal
opinion and scholarship, itself a form of social control - indigenous
litigants to adopt the role of the native caught in the past, and thus to place
themselves in relation and reaction to modernity. We will continue seeing
and encouraging if not requiring representations of the indigenous that
refer to golden pasts, or that are otherwise reactionary returns to the past.
Our continued existence on the planet is, for the first time in history, called
into question. The answers may or may not be in the past; likely they are
not. But we need the courage to understand ourselves, to imagine a rich,
multiversal future, to question the very images and symbols that we make
our laws by, and to ask whether (or not) and how (or not) they continue to
serve us.

